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THE fundamentalist-modernist controversy has reopened dis-
cussion of the so-called conflict between science and religion.
This conflict is largely a matter of definition. If one wants to be so
stupid as to define religion in terms that are incompatible with sci-
ence, there is, of course, an inevitable conflict between these fields
of interest. Thus if a man insists that religion is a matter of belief
in spirits or authority of the scriptures, it is. by hypothesis, opposed
to science. Science has no use for spirits and dogmatic authorities
would only thwart its purpose at every turn.
There is no real conflict between science and religion. Funda-
mentalist and modernist are unable to get on common ground be-
cause of a fundamental difl:'erence in types of mind. The one has
a dogmatic and authoritative, the other scientific and reflective out-
look on life. The trouble with the fundamentalist is that he has not
been scientific in his attitude toward the fundamental.' His funda-
mentals are not fundamental from the viewpoint of the modernist
;
they are ready-made, fixed and dogmatic. The modernist, in true
scientific spirit, insists upon a more philosophic attitude toward his
fundamentals. The problem for religion at this point, as he sees it,
is that of discovering what is fundamental to religion rather than
starting with the supposed fundamentals of religion and dubbing
as irreligious everything which does not square with these ready-
made fundamentals. The fundamentalist solves this problem by
ignoring it : his fundamentals block inquiry by setting up barriers
beyond which thought is not free to go. His attitude in the matter
is therefore most unscientific, and it is not at all surprising that the
modernist cannot go with him in accepting his fundamentals as
fundamental. The two simply speak a dififerent language. The
modernist has no sympathy with the antiquated viewpoint of the
fundamentalist and the fundamentalist is actually afraid of the
1 For further discussion of this point see my article on "The Role of the
Fundamental," International Journal of Ethics, Jan., 1923.
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modernist's point of view. Hence to get them together is virtually
impossible, outside of re-educating the fundamentalist.
Needless to say, our interest here in religion is from the stand-
point of the modernist. Our problem is that of finding the funda-
mentals of religion rather than starting all other problems with
themi. We shall show how the difference between science, philoso-
phy and religion is primarily one of attitudes and that these attitudes
are supplementary rather than conflicting.
The phenomena of religion may be approached from two main
angles, the metaphysical and the psychological. Of these viewpoints,
the latter is the more fruitful one for our purpose. The religious
and the scientific viewpoints were once competitors as offering a
rational explanation of the universe. Roth have their implications
concerning reality, but both have been forced to abandon their
claims at this point. If it is true that science has forced religion
to give up its claims of explaining the universe, it is also true that
philosophy, in some measure at least, has forced science to give up
its claims on this score. In fact, modern science does not pretend
ultimately to explain anything ; it merely endeavors to find out and
accurately describe what takes place in nature. The "how" and
the "what" of things ?rc as baffling for the scientist as they are
for the philosopher. Thus religion and science are on the same
plane so far as metaphysics is concerned.
The difference between the metaphysical outlooks of science
and religion may be well described by Doctor Hoffding's "circle
of existence." Inscribing a circle of existence, religion would trace
all events to the center while science endeavors only to establish
the connections between events at the periphery of the circle. Its
center is God from whom all causal series flow ; the periphery is
merely the series. Religion is interested in the universal cause while
science confines itself to specific causes. A cause that explains
everything does not explain anything from the standpoint of con-
trol. Hence a universal cause does not explain anything for scien-
tific purposes. If you are ill and wish to regain your health, it does
not help you any to know that God has caused your pain. As an
intelligent mdividual, you naturally prefer the diagnosis and treat-
ment of a competent physician, one who knows something definite
about the relations between pain, disease, food, health, etc. You
would not trust your body for surgical treatment to one who simply
knew that God must be causing some kind of a pain somewhere in
your physical anatomy. Specific relations are essential to science.
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Altliough religion traces all events to the center of the circle,
figuratively speaking, which it calls God. it cannot demonstrate His
existence. Tt is not necessary here to consider the historical argu-
ments for the existence of God. Suffice it to point out that they
convince those who are already convinced, and need no convincing,
but fail to convince those who most need it. They have never had
a reputable standing in philosophy since the time of Immanuel Kant.
One of Kant's great contributions to philosophy was that he showed
once and for all time that the three great historical arguments, viz.,
the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological proofs, prove
nothing so far as the existence of God is concerned. Since that
famous "infidel," Robert C. Ingersoll, "with tears of pity put out
the flames of hell," atheism has been regarded as somewhat of a
dead issue, but there seem to be movements for its revival at the
present time. This issue, like many other historic questions, was
not so much settled as it was outgrown. Or, as someone has well
said: "Philosophy does not so much solve questions as it does give
us insight into what kind of questions we have a right to ask." It
is a commonplace observation that the little child and the "man on
the street," about whom philosophers are wont to talk, can ask ques-
tions that will stump the most profound of thinkers. Ofttimes our
"plain man" attributes this to ignorance on the part of the philoso-
pher while he in turn has a tendency to pity his friend for his
naivette.
Of all the fields that modern psychology has invaded, none is
more interesting or enlightening than that of religion. Some of
these have been subject to exploitation but in the field of religion,
psychological investigations have thrown light on many of the prob-
lems that have perplexed philosophers throughout the ages. It by
no means follows from this that thought has come to rest on ulti-
mate questions, but it is safe to say that a new light and a better
understanding have come through the ])sychological approach than
had hitherto been gained by all the metaphysical speculations put
together.
With the encroachments of modern science upon dogmatic the-
ology from the beginnings of the overthrow of scholasticism- to the
present time, efforts to bring religion up to date have never been
found wanting. These may be found in such movements as the
religion of humanity as expounded by the French positivists and
the religion of morality as represented by our Ethical Culture Soci-
eties. Huxley's religion of Fortitude, Spinoza's religion of Contem-
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plation and the religion of the Creative Imagination as represented
by Santyana and Russell are other cases in point. William James'
classification of philosophers into the "tender minded" and the
"tough minded" groups cuts across these various types of religion.
But what is the common element, not only in these new religions,
but in the old mythical religions as well ? What is the greatest com-
mon denominator of religion? In answer to these questions the
psychologist has found a fruitful approach through the concept of
value. Wherever religious phenomena occur the value of hypothesis
seems to describe most adequately the facts under investigation.
Whether it be the myths and cults of primitive religions, the elabo-
rate theology and ritual of the medieval catholic church, or the more
progressive movements in religion today, religion at all points is
identified with values.
Religion is interested in values while science is a method for con-
trol of values. But religion is more than an interest in values ; it is
a consciousness and appreciation of the highest-felt social values.
If religion were to be stripped of its beliefs, its rituals, its sacraments
and all the elaborate customs that have grown up around it, this
consciousness and appreciation of what the group actually regards
as most significant and important would be found to be the essence
of religion. The ceremonies and sacraments, the cults and dogmas,
the myths and superstitions that have surrounded its rites are merely
attempts on the part of the group to control the values that are
felt to be of supreme worth in the life of the group. The difference
between modernist and fundamentalist here is not so much a differ-
ence as to ends and purposes as it is in means and methods of con-
trol. For the fundamentalist, the beliefs and superstitions of the
past which have grown up about religious values, have actually
become those values themselves rather than the symbols of those
values. The symbol has been taken for the thing. For the modern-
ist, who goes deeper into the meaning of his world, many of the
old traditions and much of their symbolism can be discarded with-
out destroying the values for which they have stood. But to expect
the fundamentalist to see this is asking too much for to him there
is no distinction between the thing and the thing as symbolized. To
destroy the old symbol is to destroy the value which it represents.
Because science has encroached on some of the beliefs and tradi-
tions of the old religion, it does not follow from this that it is
opposed to religious values. The modernist sees in science a most
powerful ally of religion as the most effective means for controlling
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his values while the fundamentalist sees an irreconcilable conflict
between the two because science woud deprive him of outworn
methods of control.
Religion is not a matter of belief ; it is a matter of living. A
man's life and not his belief is his religion. Religion is a matter
of belief only in so far as belief is essential to conduct. Thus if a
man believes that it is right to kill, and is ready to act accordingly,
such belief is an important matter ; it makes a difference in his con-
duct. On the other hand, what difference does it make as to
whether or not a man believes in the virgin birth? Does belief in
this dogma make a difference in conduct either one way or the other?
If so, it mav be an important matter, but for the most part, it is a dif-
ference that does not make a difference, and a difference that does
not make a difference is no difference at all. It is fair to state
that belief in dogmas is necessary only in so far as a man needs a
policeman to govern his conduct. If he needs one in order to make
him behave himself, well and good, but it is hardly fair to argue
from this that all people need policemen in order to make respect-
able citizens out of them. Just as there are those who will not
respect the law under any consideration, so there are those for
whom all the religious dogmas and superstitions in Christendom
would have no effect in keeping within the bounds of decency. It
is probably true that God has always been a much more eft'ective
policeman than man has been, but religion surely has some other
service than the police function to render and perform for society.
It was Matthew Arnold who once said that "three-fourths of
life consists of conduct"" and to this a pragmatist has added "that
the other fourth consists of something not very much different in
character."' Those who would ground religion in authority as the
only means for guiding conduct aright do but deceive themselves as
to its effectiveness. The spirit of the age is one of revolt against
unreasoned authorities, and they who think that the youth of the day
will be kept in the straight and narrow path through religious author-
ities are but dwelling in a fool's paradise. The revolt of the youth
of the land is marked and evident as revealed by Judge Lindsey's
startling but remarkable investigations. Religious forms and author-
ities will work both ways, but while they may be the saving grace
for one there are probably a hundred cases in which they are of
little or no avail, if not actually harmful. The story is told of Jona-
than Edwards, who when his daughter's suitor approached him on
the subject that was nearest his heart, could not become reconciled
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to giving his consent. The suitor was surprised and wondered why
he should meet with opposition from such a kindly gentleman as
Brother Jonathan. But this was just the trouble. The clergyman
was too kindly : he was frank and honest. The prospective son-in-
law wanted to know what was the trouble. Had his daughter not
been baptized? Had she not been saved? Had she not joined the
church? Had all the sacraments not been administered upon her?
Oh, yes, all these had been done but her father felt compelled to be
truthful and admit that "the spirit of God frequently comes into the
soul of one with whom nobody can live." On the other hand, there
are cases in which authority is the only thing that will work. A
friend of mine once related an incident in his experience that is
apropos. V young fellow once told him that if it were not for his
belief in hell he most certainly would go there. My friend took the
fellow and reasoned with him, showing him that there is no such
thing as hell outside of that which we sometimes experience on this
terrestrial planet, and, sure enough, the fellow did go there. There
was a time when superstition had some utility, as Hobbes pointed
out, but that time is fast going for the mass of mankind. We can-
not expect to educate people and dupe them at the same time : the
two attitudes conflict. Superstition and fear of authority may work
in some cases of course, but such methods are futile for the normal,
healthy, active and aggressive youth of today. Knowledge, insight,
understanding and information are the things demanded by the
youth of today, and there is no realm so sacred that it is not subject
to his investigation. Tt is simply a question as to whether he shall
be guided ;ind directed in his experiences with life or as to whether
he shall be left to his own devices. Ignorance and fear are methods
that have never worked and they are methods that stand the least
chance of working today that they have at any other period in
history.
Religion is a matter of conduct and hence the inseparable relation
between it ?nd morality. It is a kind of life; it is living for the
highest-felt social values. In as much as all values are a product
of social relationships, i. e., they must occur in society, all values, to
some extent, are social in character but some are more social than
others. It is not only the greatest and the best, the most social of
values but it is the highest-felt social values with which religion
becomes identified. The values for which religion stands are those
that are actually felt as most important and significant to the group.
The social value of conduct or an institution is determined by the
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extent to which these further group purposes and interests are deter-
mined hy the group in (iuestion. At this point it is necessary to
make a distinction between vakies which are most worth .while and
of the highest type in character and those which are felt as such by
the group. These may coincide. ])rovided the group purpose be a
social purpose. Because an institution is felt of supremie worth by
a group it by no means follows from this that such is actually the
case. A striking examj)le of this may be found in the institution of
war which has always received religious significance, despite its
verbal condemnation in peace time. The high tension in society
produced by a state of war necessarily gives that institution a tre-
mendous religious significance from the standpoint of values that
are felt at stake in the struggle. The point here is not as to whether
the values are really worth while or as to whether they are actually
at stake but as to the fact tha^: they are felt as such. Religion can
no longer aftord to assume an attitude of condonation toward such
an institution as war. War has become an anachronism in modern
society and if religion continues to sanction it, it is thereby rendered
the worst form of hypocrisy.- The blessings of the church upon
another world war would render organized religion a mere mockery.
It is to prevent the sanctioning of unworthy causes by religion that
religion needs philosophy.
Because of its interest in social values, religion has a tendency
to become conservative. As Lester Ward has well said: 'Tt is the
great conservative force that holds the social world in its orbit." It
has always been the great conservator of human values. But relig-
ion must seek and find new values as well as conserve the old ones
In this age of rapid and strenuous living, there is little to be said
for a force that is merely conservative. W^e are living in a chang-
ing world and religion only blocks progress and defeats its own best
interests Avhen it becomes too conservative. Why cling to empty
husks after life has long since been snapped out of them by the
march of progress? The appeal from providence to progress is an
indicator of the new sphere for religion. Although progress is dif-
ficult to define, 't is one of the outstanding characteristics of the
modern world. Religion should become a more progressive force
in society. It is only as it so becomes that it is vitalized. It needs
to imbibe some of the spirit of the immortal Woodrow Wilson who
once said that he would rather lose in a cause that he knew would
- For further discussion of war morality, see my paper entitled, Do We
Need a Moral Equivalent for War?
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win some day than to win in a cause that he knew must ultimately
fail. Our fundamentalist and anti-league of nations' friends may
well take warning at this point.
The greatest values are personal in character: hence the tend-
ency of God to become personal. Thus He is good ; He is righteous ;
He is merciful ; He is just ; He is benevolent ; He is perfect, omnis-
cient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. Why? Because these are the
characteristics in human relations that we either most like to find
or should like to find. In either case, we value them most, but for
those of us who perhaps are of a more "tough-minded" nature, wis-
dom, power and presence will be sufficient as over against perfection,
not only in these but in the moral attributes of the infinite God as
well. "Tender-minded" folk will doubtless require the infinite God
of the older theology but a finite God who possesses both the meta-
physical and the moral attributes of the perfect God in relative
degree, may be all that we have a right to expect. He needs our
help much more than did the God of the old theology. But which-
ever He may be, both His metaphysical and His moral attributes
may be accounted for by the value hypothesis. They are the finer
and the nobler traits of human nature. Raise human values to a
superior degree and you get divinity. That man is made in the image
of God is only half the story: God is also made in the image of man.
The power of God is like the power of an ideal. We make our own
ideals but they turn around and make us. "Tell me the kind of
god a man worships and I will tell you what he is" is true, but the
reference is to his activities, his interests and his pursuits rather
than to his mere beliefs and pretensions. Obviously the form is
a dynamic and vital factor in the life of an individual whereas the
latter is of no particular power in the molding of character. God
is the social ideal.
Here someone may object to this "subjective religion" on the
grounds that our God is merely psychological. What of His exist-
ence? This raises the question as to the relation between value and
reality : a most interesting and perfectly legitimate question, but
one that would take us somewhat beyond the limits of our present
discussion. In passing, it might be well to point out, however, that
the answer will depend somewhat on our conception of reality. Much
confusion in the matter has doubtless been due to the tendency to
think of reality in merely physical terms. God is a social realitw
May not social realities be as real as physical existents? The tend-
ency to think of reality in physical rather than social terms is prob-
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ably due to the priority of development of the .physical as compared
with the social sciences. So far as metaphysics is concerned, how-
ever, physical existents have about as ghostly an appearance as social
realities after the philosopher gets through with them. If anything,
the latter seem to have the more respectable standing in the court
of reality.
The old anthropomorphic conception of God as a ruler seated
on his heavenly throne wearing a golden crown and wielding a
golden sceptre is essentially autocratic in character and arose in the
days when men believed in the subject-ruler relationship between
the individual and the state. It is here interesting to note that
although Christianity has always denounced materialism, it was un-
able to eliminate the element of gold, either from the picture of its
heaven or the picture of its god, due to the fact that men do actu-
ally desire gold. Lack of "the root of all evil" has -probably been
responsible for as much evil in the world as has the possession of
the root in super-abundance. The Christian religion still carries
vestiges of its tribal and feudal origin in such terms as "The Master"
and "The Lord." These were class distinctions that were recog-
nized in the social order of the times and, like ruler, were attributed
to the religious symbolism which reflected the social and political
conceptions of the day. God should no longer be thought of as a
ruler but rather as a companion and helper. He helps man to help
himself. V more democratic conception of God is much more fit-
ting for present-day religion. Such a conception might very appro-
priately regard Him as a fit candidate for President of the League
of Nations and Chief Justice of the World Court.
Religion personifies ; science depersonalizes. If you want to
understand yourself you must treat yourself as a thing. Science
says it thinks. It \iews nature as impersonal and man as a part of
nature. Science naturalizes man and religion humanizes nature.
Both processes are necessary. The difiference between science, phil-
osophy and religion is one of attitudes. If human nature were a
simple affair we should not have these different viewpoints. Relig-
ion is an active, appreciative attitude toward value ; philosophy is a
critical, reflective attitude toward value : scence is non-valuational in
its character. Philosophy applies a scientific method to value and
thus becomes the meeting place of science and religion.
These ure supplementary rather than conflicting attitudes. It is
only by viewing them as such that harmony, proportion and perspec-
tive may be kept in life. If left to themselves without proper edu-
478 THE OPEN COURT
cation, they will have a tendency to pull apart just as will the intel-
lectual, the emotional and the volitional aspects of self without such
education. Just as it is quite possible for an individual to become
unbalanced regarding these phases of the development of his per-
sonality, so is it perfectly possible for these dominant attitudes
toward life as reflected in philosophy, science and religion to receive
a disproportionate development in any given state of society. Indeed,
the demands of an age of specialization such as the modern indus-
trial world calls for, not only make such a development more dan-
gerous than it has been at any other period in the history of civiliza-
tion, but make imperative the preservation of balance in these atti-
tudes if life and society are to continue and endure. An individual
may be able to blunder his way through life with a lop-sided devel-
opment of his personality, but the recent great war has taught us,
or rather should have taught us, that it is no longer possible for
civilization to endure with a corresponding lop-sided development
of its philosophic, its scientific and its religious interests. Society
must preserve a balance in these fields of interest if it is to protect
itself against its own ultimate annihilation. This is the message of
the greatest tragedy in history.
This is probably one of the greatest problems, if not the greatest
problem, that confronts the world at the present time. The difficulty
is not due to the fact that we do not have plenty of religion, plenty
of science and plenty of philosophy. We are supplied with these
in abundance, enough so at least to make this old world of ours
quite a different place in which to live, and yet, behold the sorry
spectacle of the human drama that is still ours to witness ! Until
the recent developments of modern science, man's ferocity at its
best was somewhat harmless as his methods of destruction were
unable to keep pace with his ferocity ; but the situation is reversed
today. Methods and implements of destruction have grown way
beyond the resources and capacities of human nature for develop-
ment of ferocity and hatred. Consequently it is necessary actually
to whip nations into warfare at the present time. Even the whip-
ping cannnt fan the passions of men into a state of ferocity and
hatred at all comparable with the destructiveness of the machines
and devices they wield. Thus it is we find ourselves the victim of
an institution because science, philosophv and religion are not free
to perform their true functions and render their respective services
to a needy mankind. A faculty psychology has always been more
or less of a myth but a faculty world is a stern reality, and it is one
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of the most serious problems for education at the present time.
We pride ourselves on our freedom and tolerance and yet social
science is today in practically the same position as physical science
in the days of Galileo and Copernicus, so far as its applications are
concerned. With our knowledge of social science now extant we
could make tremendous strides toward the solution of our social,
political and economic problems, but we are not free to apply it.
The corps of expert scientists that President Wilson had at work
on the new peace was simply scrapped in the interests of "practical"
politics. The result has been this period of exhaustion that w^e
naively call "peace." Tt is true that we no longer give our heretics
the rack and the thumb-screw or the stake as in the days of the
renaissance : we have a much more cordial method of treatment.
We simply quietly and politely deprive them of an opportunity to
make a decent and respectable living. A\'ith the application of the
physical sciences to industrial processes and the world of human
relations still ruled by passion, prejudice and superstition, humanity
today is facing the abyss of destruction.
Never has religion been in such a position to realize its values
as it is at the present time. Tt has had to resort to other worldliness
and project its values into another realm in the past, so hopeless
was the condition of the world for their realization and so impotent
was it in coping with its problems. But science has changed this
outlook for religion if she will but co-operate with it. Religion
needs science in order to actualize its values. Tlirougli science the
ideal may be made tlie real. Science needs philosophy in order prop-
erly to direct its interests. Science is cold : it seeks neither the good
nor the bad of its phenomena. It merely inquires as to how nature
behaves but nature itself is neutral regarding value so far as science
is concerned. The methods of science are as effective for pestilence
and disease as they are for life and health, and without philosophy
to guide this spirit of investigation, science will only enslave man
rather than set him free as is its true mission. Religion needs philos-
ophy to analyze its values ; without such analysis it has a tendency
to degenerate ; it is apt to become all heat and no light. Philosophy
gives light to religion and thus directs its energies into worthy and
constructive enterprises. Philosophy needs religion in order to
accomplish its purposes. Religion furnishes the necessary motor
power for getting results in the world of action. It is the human
dynamo, but like an automobile, it needs direction. Religion with-
out science is impotent while science without religion is cold ; science
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without philosophy is brutal while philosophy without science is
empty
;
philosophy without religion is sterile while religion without
philosophy is blind.
Although modern society presents many more classes than are
here represented by science, philosophy and religion, these attitudes
are inter-penetrative and cut across various classes as they repre-
sent three dominant attitudes toward life. Men possess these atti-
tudes in varying degrees and the work of the world necessitates a
division of labor based on individual differences. We may find an
interesting parallel in Plato's Republic in which justice consists of
each individual doing that for which he is best fitted. Our philoso-
pher is still our guide although Plato's dream of the days when
philosophers should be kings has by no means been realized. Our
warrior class has been succeeded by the man of action in the new
crusader as the champion and protector of religious values. But he
is a man of peace rather than a man of war, while our husbandmen
have given way to the modern scientist who holds in his possession
the secrets of nature and can make nature do his bidding. The
analogy wall hold still further for surely if ever the philosopher
needed wisdom he needs it today and if ever the man of religion
needed courage he needs it today. Rut it must be a new courage
;
it must be a civic rather than a military courage. The world is
rich in military courage but it is sadly lacking in civic courage. Per-
haps we might exchange the virtue of temperance for the patience
of the scientist, but our picture is not complete until we emphasize,
as Plato did. the fact that each must possess justice, for it is justice,
alone, that can preserve the proper balance and harmony in society.
Justice in the individual was a harmony of the virtues and so justice
in society 1? a harmony of interests.
That religion is powerless to realize an ideal social order with-
out the instrumentality of science is well illustrated by its failure
to abolish the institution of war from the earth. For nearly two
thousand years the gospel of The Prince of Peace has been preached
throughout the civilized world, and yet, in the second decade of the
twentieth century, the church of Christ found itself as helpless as
a new-born babe to prevent that hell that was turned loose upon the
world in August, 1914. Peace is not an impossible goal for human-
ity ; it is more than a beautiful dream ; it is a value that may become
an actuality. It can be realized, provided we are willing to assume
a scientific attitude toward it. Like every value in human experi-
ence, it has its price and this price is the reconstruction of ideas
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that represent recognized values, values which, although they may
not be recognized in the world of thought, are tacitly implied in the
world of action. We cannot continue to think in one world and
act in another and expect to get peace.
Another excellent illustration may be found in home life in con-
nection with the value of love. Surely this is one of the greatest,
if not the greatest, value that life affords. Yet without knowledge
and insight into many of the subtleties of the marriage relation, the
matrimonial, ship may be destined for the rock-bound coast of un-
happiness. despite the best of motives and intentions. This is but
one instance in home relations but many might be cited. Health,
birth control and food supply are other cases in point.
It is no more reasonable to suppose that all men are religious
than it is to assume that they are all philosophers. It is probably
true that men do not vary in their capacity for the appreciation of
value quite to the extent that they do in their intellectual attainments,
and yet there are those in whom this capacity approaches closely to
the zero mark, if it does not actually reach it. just as there are those
in whom the same condition obtains in the realm of the intellect.
Some people are more religious than others because they possess
a greater capacity for responding deeply to the nobler and richer
interests of life. We are religious to the extent that we respond to
the highest and best things in life. Since religion's prime interest
is that of finding and conserving the most social of values, it is only
natural thac it should become interested in ultimate questions. It
is at this point that its interests are closely related to the metaphysi-
cal aspects of philosophy. To restrict it to this capacity for enjoy-
ment of another realm, as Burns does,' would seem to render it too
esoteric in character.
The introduction of a philosophic element into religion brings
with it. relative, as over against absolute standards in ethics and a
practical, as over against the absolute absolute of the old religion.
These in turn call for problematic attitudes and it is questionable as
to whether the same enthusiasm can be gained for "practical abso-
lutes" and "hypothetical imperatives" that has hitherto been gained
for the "absolute absolutes" and "categorical imperatives" of the
past. Some of the old religious enthusiasm will doubtless be lost.
This is all too true, but what religion may lose in heat it will gain
in light so that the loss has its compensating value. Perhaps only
''
"The Old Religion and the New." Intcrnal'wnal Journal of Ethics, Oct
.
1924.
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the combustible and inflammable heat may be lost in the transaction,
and if so, who would want to revive it? However this may be, there
is little to be said for a religion that does not square with life and
life is but one problem after another. The late Professor Foster
happily and expressively put it when he said that "Life is a matter
of problemizing-, reproblemizing and deproblemizing." Philosophy's
contribution to religion at this point may well prove a blessing in
disguise.
It may help religion to forget its petty theological controversies
and its narrow sectarian disputes and see with IngersoU his vision of
The Cooperative State and ally itself with science for the making of
this vision c- reality
:
"I see a world where thrones have crumbled and where kings
are dust. The aristocracy of idleness has perished from the earth.
'T see a world without a slave. Man at last is free. Nature's
forces have by science been enslaved. Lightning and light, wind
and wa\'e, irost and flame and all the secret subtle powders of earth
and air are the tireless toilers for the human race.
'T see a world at peace adorned with every form of art, with
music's myriad voices thrilled while lips are rich with words of love
and truth— a world in which no exile sighs, no prisoner mourns; a
world on which the gibljct's shadow does not fall ; a world where
labor reaps its full reward : where work and worth go hand in hand ;
^vhere the poor girl in trvin^ to win l)read with the needle— the
needle, that has been called 'the asp for the breast of the poor'—is
not driven to the desperate choice of crime or death, or suicide or
shame.
"T see a world without the beggars' outstretched palm, the mis-
er's heartless, stony stare, the piteous wail of want, the livid \\\)s of
lies, the cruel eyes of scorn.
"T see a race without disease of flesh or brain—shapely and fair,
the married harmony of form and function—and, as I look, life
lengthens, joy deepens, love canopies the earth ; and over all in the
great dome, shines the eternal star of human hope."
Tt luav not be a moral universe such as we should like to have
it, but it is for most part at least, a universe that is capable of sus-
taining a moral order if we will but co-operate with it, even though
such co-operation may reciuire of us "the massing of interests
against a reluctant cosmos." Tt is for the philosopher to see this,
the scientist to show the way ^ind the religionist to bring it about.
"Tn union there is strength." The fundamentalist, who apparently
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is more interested in where man came from than where the world
is going, would have us believe that religious faith consists of believ-
ing things that are hard to believe, propositions that are an insult
to our intelligence, while the modernist sees in religious faith the
untold and unrealized possibilities of the universe for humankind.
Science takes for its axiom the conservation of energy ; religion takes
for its axiom the conservation of value. Neither can prove its
axiom. To believe that somehow or somewhere the values for
which we live, the interests for which we strive and the ideals for
which we struggle may be realized and conserved is all that religious
faith requires of us.
